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Another major Proposition 103 case is
still pending before the California Supreme
Court. In Amwest Surety Insurance Com-
pany v. Wilson, 35 Cal. App. 4th 1355
(Dec. 8, 1993), the Second District Court
of Appeal struck down a 1990 statute ex-
empting surety companies from the roll-
back and prior approval provisions of Prop-
osition 103 because it does not "further the
purposes" of the initiative and is thus
beyond the authority of the legislature.
[14:2&3 CRLR 139; 14:1 CRLR 108;
13:2&3 CRLR 130] At this writing, oral
argument is set for December 5.
On May 3, the California Supreme Court
heard oral argument in the insurance indus-
try's appeal of the First District Court of
Appeal's decision in Manufacturers Life
Insurance Company, et al. v. Superior
Court (Weil Insurance Agency, Real Party
in Interest), 27 Cal. App. 4th 67 (July 29,
1994); in that decision, the First District
held that an insurance brokerage may not
bring a private cause of action for redress
of an unlawful group boycott by other
insurers under the Unfair Insurance Prac-
tices Act (UIPA), Insurance Code section
790 et seq., but it may pursue antitrust
remedies under the Cartwright Act, Busi-
ness and Professions Code section 16720
et seq., and injunctive and restitutionary
relief under the Unfair Competition Act
(UCA), Business and Professions Code
section 17200 etseq. [15:1 CRLR 116-17;
14:4 CRLR 131; 14:2&3 CRLR 139] At







P ursuant to Vehicle Code section 3000
et seq., the New Motor Vehicle Board
(NMVB) licenses new motor vehicle deal-
erships and regulates dealership reloca-
tions and manufacturer terminations of
franchises. It reviews disciplinary action
taken against dealers by the Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV). Most licensees
deal in cars or motorcycles.
NMVB is authorized to adopt regula-
tions to implement its enabling legisla-
tion; the Board's regulations are codified
in Chapter 2, Division 1, Title 13 of the
California Code of Regulations (CCR).
The Board also handles disputes arising
out of warranty reimbursement schedules.
After servicing or replacing parts in a car
under warranty, a dealer is reimbursed by
the manufacturer. The manufacturer sets
reimbursement rates which a dealer occa-
sionally challenges as unreasonable. In-
frequently, the manufacturer's failure to
compensate the dealer for tests performed
on vehicles is questioned.
*MAJOR PROJECTS
NMVB's Award of Attorneys' Fees
Questioned. Mathew Zaheri Corporation,
dba Hayward Mitsubishi v. Mitsubishi
Motor Sales of America, et al., Petition No.
P-233-92 and Protest No. PR-1254-92, is a
complex matter which involves a number of
issues stemming from Mathew Zaheri's
claim that Mitsubishi unfairly charged back
to Zaheri over $137,000 in warranty claims
over a two-year period. The dispute between
Zaheri and Mitsubishi has been pending in
both state and federal court for several years;
in 1993, the First District Court of Appeal
dismissed Zaheri's civil complaint against
Mitsubishi on the basis that the plaintiff
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
before NMVB. [13:4 CRLR 201] In October
1994, NMVB found that Mitsubishi unfairly
charged back over $57,000 in claims; how-
ever, NMVB also found that Zaheri had
engaged in "massive warranty fraud," and
that it claimed reimbursements for work not
done and parts not used in somewhere be-
tween 50 and 2,000 claims. Accordingly, the
Board denied Zaheri's petition and protest,
and awarded costs and reasonable attorneys'
fees against Zaheri in favor of Mitsubishi.
[15:1 CRLR 162-63]
On March 21, NMVB adopted the
proposed ruling of Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) Douglas Drake which granted
$68,132.62 in attorneys' fees and $38,239.91
in costs to Mitsubishi. According to NMVB,
in May 1994, the pending federal action
between Zaheri and Mitsubishi was re-
manded to NMVB, so that "under the doc-
trine of primary jurisdiction, [NMVB]
should decide the federal issues raised in
the [federal] lawsuit...." The Board's deci-
sion also declared that NMVB "has juris-
diction to award attorneys' fees once the
case has been the subject of a Petition for
Writ of Mandate to the California Superior
Court," and that NMVB has jurisdiction
to award attorneys' fees even when none
were requested by Mitsubishi "because
the fees were requested in the federal ac-
tion and the Board was requested to deter-
mine all facts necessary to decide the fed-
eral issues." The only statutory basis for
an award of attorneys' fees in any of the
pending actions stems from Zaheri's alle-
gation in the federal proceeding that Mit-
subishi violated the Civil Rights Act.
In a dissenting opinion, NMVB mem-
ber George Leaver was highly critical of
the Board's decision, stating that it "is
based upon the erroneous and absurd prem-
ise that ...the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California ruled
in Hayward Mitsubishi v. Mitsubishi Motor
Sales of America that the Board should
decide the federal issues raised in that
lawsuit." Leaver stated that the U.S. Dis-
trict Court "made no such ruling," and
explained that the court stayed action on
two federal causes of action "pending the
Board's determination of the Petition of
Hayward Mitsubishi before the Board in-
volving the validity of its warranty claims."
Further, Leaver stated that the U.S. Dis-
trict Court "in its order makes it abun-
dantly clear that the Board's determina-
tion of the validity of the warranty claim
should provide the federal court with a
solid factual foundation on which the fed-
eral court may rely in deciding the federal
claims." Leave also wrote that "[s]ince no
one disputes the fact that he only statutory
basis for an award of attorneys' fees in any
of the pending actions stems from the pro-
visions of the federal Civil Rights Act, and
since the Federal District Court and only
the Federal District Court, will decide
whether that Act was violated, only the
Federal District Court can decide the issue
of attorneys' fees. The Board simply has
no jurisdiction to make such an award."
Protest/Petition Actions. On March
21, NMVB adopted an ALJ's proposed
decision in Santa Monica BMW, Inc. v.
BMW of North America and BMW of
Beverly Hills (Petition No. P-225-9 1), re-
jecting petitioner's claims that-among
other things-BMW of North America
(BMWNA) violated Vehicle Code sections
11713.3(d) and (o). In 1991, over the
objections of BMW of Santa Monica,
BMWNA purchased the assets of Zipper
BMW in Beverly Hills; BMWNA created
BMW of Beverly Hills in 1991 and oper-
ated the dealership from August 1991
through April 1994. Between August 1991
and late 1992, BMWNA attempted to ne-
gotiate the sale of the dealership to Hans
Geisler, a former Zipper general manager,
who was ultimately unable to obtain suf-
ficient capital to purchase the franchise.
Upon the failure of the Geisler negotia-
tions, BMWNA offered the franchise for
sale in both the Los Angeles Times and
Automotive News; BMWNA received ap-
proximately six responses to the adver-
tisements, and eventually sold the fran-
chise in 1994.
Petitioner claimed that BMWNA vio-
lated Vehicle Code section 11713.3(d),
which provides that it is unlawful for a
manufacturer or distributor to prevent or
require the sale or transfer of any part of a
dealer's interest in the dealership to an-
other person. Specifically, the petitioner
California Regulatory Law Reporter • Vol. 15, Nos. 2&3 (SpringlSummer 1995)194
REGULATORY AGENCY ACTION
claimed that BMWNA prevented or at-
tempted to prevent any other qualified in-
dividual from purchasing the assets of
Zipper. However, NMVB found that Zip-
per had requested BMWNA to purchase
the franchise and its assets, BMWNA had
done so "in order to preserve its image
in a key and prestigious market," and
BMWNA did not prevent or attempt to
prevent Zipper from selling its assets or
require or attempt to require Zipper to sell
its assets.
The petitioner also claimed that
BMWNA violated section 11713.3(o),
which prohibits a manufacturer or distrib-
utor from competing with a dealer in the
same line-make in the dealer's relevant
market area; however, the section also
provides that a manufacturer or distributor
shall not be deemed to be competing when
operating a dealership either temporarily
for a reasonable period, or when in a bona
fide retail operation which is for sale to
any qualified independent person at a fair
and reasonable price, among other things.
NMVB found that BMWNA was selling
BMWs within the same relevant market
area as one of its franchisees. However,
NMVB also determined that BMWNA op-
erated BMW of Beverly Hills temporarily
for a reasonable period of time, and that
BMW of Beverly Hills was a bona fide
retail operation that was for sale to any
qualified individual at a fair and reason-
able price. Accordingly, NMVB rejected
petitioner's claims.
On January 25, NMVB adopted an
ALJ's proposed decision in Sunnyday
Chevrolet v. General Motors Corpora-
tion, etal. (Protest No. PR- 1407-94), find-
ing that there was good cause to terminate
each of petitioner's five General Motors
(GM) franchises. The owner of Sunnyday
Chevrolet, Robert Lantham, obtained his
Barstow dealership in 1981; over the next
four years, he added four other GM fran-
chises: Buick, Cadillac, Oldsmobile, and
Pontiac. In 1991, Lantham acquired a
Victorville dealership for Mazda, Subaru,
Isuzu, and Dihatsu. GMAC, a lending in-
stitution that finances dealer purchases of
new vehicles, provided inventory financ-
ing for both dealerships. The GM dealer
agreements expressly required Lantham
to have and maintain a line of credit from
a financial institution to finance the pur-
chase of new vehicle inventory; the agree-
ments also required prompt repayment of
the advances on the sale of the vehicles,
and stated that failure to comply with these
requirements was grounds for termination
of the franchise. Between 1991 and 1994,
a string of events at both dealerships led
the GMAC staff to conclude that Lantham
was not performing satisfactorily under
the GMAC agreement; this ultimately led
GMAC to cancel Lantham's wholesale
credit on February 13, 1993. Upon receiv-
ing notification that GMAC had canceled
its financing agreement with Lantham,
GM advised Lantham that he was in
breach of the GM dealer agreement.
Lantham was unable to secure another
source of financing over the next fourteen
months and on April 19, 1994, GM noti-
fied Lantham and NMVB of its intent to
terminate Lantham's franchises. On May
23, 1994, Lantham filed a timely protest
pursuant to Vehicle Code section 3060.
GM alleged that Lantham committed a
material breach of the GM Dealer Sales
and Service Agreement because he failed
to maintain inventory financing as re-
quired. GM also contended that, as a result
of his breach, Lantham's new vehicle in-
ventory and sales declined to an unaccept-
able level. Lantham claimed that GM and
GMAC harassment and breach of their
implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing excused any breach he may have
committed. Lantham claimed that GM and
GMAC wanted to remove him as a dealer
because he is African-American, and that
they conspired to deprive him of his inven-
tory financing in order to make the termi-
nation appear legitimate.
NMVB found that Lantham materially
breached his inventory financing agree-
ment with GMAC by failing to provide
GMAC with access to his inventory and
files, failing to promptly pay GMAC from
the proceeds of his sale of GMAC-fi-
nanced inventory, failing to pay allow-
ances for excess mileage on new vehicles,
manipulating records to conceal the actual
dates of vehicle sales, and failing to re-
spond to financial information requests by
GMAC. Additionally, NMVB found that
Lantham failed to establish that either GM
or GMAC unreasonably harassed him in
administering the inventory financing
agreement, that GMAC acted unreason-
ably in canceling the financing agreement,
or that GMAC interfered with Lantham's
efforts to replace his canceled financing
with another financial institution. NMVB
also found that GM and GMAC suffi-
ciently established the relevant facts and
circumstances surrounding the termina-
tion as required by Vehicle Code section
3061.
On January 25, NMVB adopted an
ALJ's proposed decision in Don Lucas
International, Inc. dba Stevens Creek
BMW Motorsport v. BMW of North Amer-
ica, Inc. (Protest no. PR- 1421-94), permit-
ting BMWNA to relocate Allison Bavar-
ian, Inc., dba Allison BMW, which is cur-
rently located in Sunnyvale, to a new lo-
cation in Mountain View; Allison's cur-
rent facility lacks freeway accessibility
and has inadequate customer and repair
facilities. Stevens Creek is a new motor
vehicle dealer franchised to sell BMW
vehicles at its location in Santa Clara.
BMW seeks to move Allison, currently
located 3.73 miles from Stevens Creek, to
a new location that is 6.3 miles from Ste-
vens Creek. On June 1, 1994, pursuant to
Vehicle Code section 3062, BMWNA
gave Stevens Creek notice of the reloca-
tion; on June 9, 1994, Stevens Creek filed
this protest with NMVB.
NMVB found that the relocation will
expand Stevens Creek's primary market
area by almost 10,000; with the relocation,
Stevens Creek will also become the clos-
est service dealership for an additional
3,000 currently operating BMW vehicles.
NMVB also found that Stevens Creek
failed to prove any of the five elements
under Vehicle Code section 3063 needed
to establish good cause not to permit the
relocation of Allison BMW.
On January 25, NMVB adopted an
ALJ's proposed decision in Rancourt Inc.
dba Carmichael Honda v. American
Honda Motor Company, Inc. (Protest No.
PR-Unassigned), dismissing on proce-
dural grounds Carmichael's protest of a
franchise termination. Honda's basis for
the termination was an alleged violation
by Carmichael of a consent decree be-
tween Honda and the Consumer Products
Safety Commission concerning the sale of
all-terrain vehicles (ATV) to children.
On September 3, 1994, Carmichael re-
ceived, by certified mail, notice of Honda's
intention to terminate Carmichael's fran-
chise; although Vehicle Code section 3060
requires that a protest be filed within thirty
days from receipt of the notice of termina-
tion, NMVB did not receive Carmichael's
protest and request for hearing until Octo-
ber 5, 1994. In response to Honda's claim
that the protest was untimely, Carmichael
challenged the manner in which Honda
served the notice of termination; specific-
ally, Carmichael argued that Honda's
method of serving notice of termination
through the U.S. Postal Service was defec-
tive, and claimed that a notice of termina-
tion requires personal service. Carmichael
further argued that Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 1013(a) extends the time for
filing a protest by five days.
NMVB found that the service of a no-
tice of termination pursuant o Vehicle
Code section 3060 by the franchisor to the
franchisee is not a writ or summons to a
civil court; in deciding the section 1013
claim, NMVB relied on Citicorp North
America, Inc. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal.
App. 3d 563, 568 (1989), which holds that
section 1013 may not be utilized to extend
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jurisdictional limits or statutes of limita-
tion. Since the time limitations in section
3060 are statutes of limitations, NMVB
decided that section 1013(a) does not ex-
tend the time for filing a protest under
section 3060.
Further, in Colyear v. Tobriner, 7 Cal.
2d 735 (1936), the California Supreme
Court held that where a statute requires
notice and does not specify how it shall be
given, the presumption is that personal
service is required; however, the court
stated that personal service may be made
through the instrumentality of the mails,
and that the post office, as well as any
other type of messenger, may be used to
effect personal service. Accordingly,
NMVB concluded that Honda's service of
its notice of termination by means of the
U.S. Postal Service is valid, and thus re-
fused to accept Carmichael's protest as
being timely filed.
On March 21, NMVB adopted an
ALJ's proposed decision in Greenwood
Pontiac v. General Motors Corporation,
Pontiac Motor Division, and GMC Truck
Division, Protest No. PR-1418-94, in
which Greenwood challenged General
Motors' (GM) disallowance of several
dealer incentive payments. Following a
warranty and sales audit of Greenwood's
franchise, GM informed Greenwood that
its auditors found deviations from GM's
policies and procedures concerning the
sales of 73 vehicles for which Greenwood
had been credited with incentive pay-
ments; specifically, the auditors deter-
mined that 68 of the vehicles had been sold
for resale and another two had been re-
ported as stolen. GM took the position that
because none of these units were sold to
retail buyers, they were not eligible for
dealer incentive payments. GM subse-
quently debited Greenwood's dealer ac-
count in the amount of $81,644.72.
GM contended that its Dealer Sales
and Service Agreement contains ageneral
prohibition against new vehicle exports by
any dealer, and that its documented poli-
cies for allowance and incentive programs
do now allow incentive payments for ve-
hicles sold for export or resale. Green-
wood did not contend that he subject ve-
hicles were not sold for resale, or not ex-
ported as alleged by GM; instead, Green-
wood claimed that it did not have a current
copy of the GM Truck Dealer Incentive
Allowance Program Manual, and that it in-
terpreted the incentive programs differently.
Greenwood contended that the chargebacks
constitute an unlawful contractual penalty,
whereas GM claimed that the chargebacks
were merely debits for payments it had al-
ready advanced but which were not right-
fully earned by Greenwood.
Based on the information provided by
GM to all of its franchisees, NMVB deter-
mined that the 68 vehicles sold for resale
were not eligible for incentives and allow-
ances; however, NMVB found that GM
failed to show that the stolen vehicles were
ineligible at the time the allowances were
made. The Board also found that the
chargebacks did not constitute penalties,
as GM was merely recovering payments
already awarded to Greenwood after dis-
covering that the payments were made
improperly.
NMVB Drops Proposal to Increase
Fees. In December 1994, NMVB pub-
lished notice of its intent to amend section
553, Title 13 of the CCR, in order to raise
its original and renewal licensing fees from
$300 to $350; the action also would have
increased from $0.45 to $0.55 the amount
paid per vehicle distributed by a manufac-
turer or distributor in California, and in-
creased from $300 to $350 the minimum
distribution fee to be paid by each manu-
facturer. [15:1 CRLR 163] The Board re-
ceived public comments on the proposal
until January 23; since that date, however,
the Board had decided to drop this pro-
posed regulatory action.
U LEGISLATION
AB 28 (Gallegos). Existing law makes
it unlawful for the holder of any dealer's
license, as specified, to fail to disclose in
writing to the buyer of a new motor vehi-
cle, that the vehicle, as equipped, may not
be operated on a highway signed for the
requirement of tire chains if the owner's
manual or other material provided by the
manufacturer states that the vehicle, as
equipped, may not be operated with tire
chains. As amended April 25, this bill would
require the dealer to provide the disclosure
to the buyer with a specified statement in not
less than 14-point boldface type on a single
piece of paper. The bill would require the
dealer to furnish the buyer with a copy of the
disclosure, signed by the buyer, at the time
of purchase of the vehicle. The bill would
impose a specified fine for a violation of
those provisions. [A. Appr]
AB 1383 (Speier), as amended May 4,
would repeal existing law which requires
the Department of Consumer Affairs' Ar-
bitration Review Program to regulate and
certify arbitration programs for "lemon
law" disputes between auto manufacturers
and consumers.
Existing law generally provides for re-
lief for a failure to comply with the Song-
Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. That Act
requires, if a manufacturer or its represen-
tative in this state is unable to service or
repair a new motor vehicle to conform to
the applicable express warranties after a
reasonable number of attempts, the manu-
facturer to either promptly replace the new
motor vehicle or promptly make restitution
to the buyer, as specified. Existing law spe-
cifically provides that if the buyer estab-
lishes a violation of this provision, the buyer
shall recoverdamages, reasonable attorneys'
fees, and costs and may recover a civil pen-
alty, except as specified. This bill would
delete the specific provisions regarding
recovery of damages, attorneys' fees, and
costs, and a civil penalty. [A. Appr]
AB 1381 (Speier). The Automotive
Consumer Notification Act requires the
seller of a vehicle to include a specified
"lemon law" disclosure if that vehicle has
been returned, or should have been re-
turned, to the dealer or manufacturer for
failure to conform to warranties. As
amended April 26, this bill would revise
and recast the Automotive Consumer No-
tification Act within the provisions of the
Vehicle Code. The bill would require the
manufacturer to retitle specified defective
vehicles in its name, request DMV to in-
scribe the ownership certificate with a
"lemon buy-back" notation, affix a "lemon
buy-back" decal to the left door frame of
the vehicle, deliver a specified notice to
the transferee of the vehicle, and obtain
the transferee's acknowledgment. The bill
would provide that any person damaged
by the failure of a manufacturer or dealer
to comply with these requirements shall
have the same rights and remedies as those
provided to a buyer of consumer goods by
specified provisions relating to warranty.
The bill would provide that it shall apply
only to vehicles reacquired by a manufac-
turer on or after the effective date of the
Act. [A. Floor]
SB 1085 (Wright), as amended April
5, is a spot bill making minor changes in
the law requiring DCA to certify qualified
third-party dispute resolution processes to
resolve "lemon law" disputes. [S. Rls]
AB 770 (Aguiar). Existing law pro-
hibits the holder of any motor vehicle
dealer's license from advertising for sale
or selling any new vehicle of a line-make
for which the dealer does not hold a fran-
chise; a violation of that provision is a mis-
demeanor. Existing law makes several ex-
ceptions to that general prohibition, in-
cluding transactions involving a commer-
cial vehicle. As amended May 1I, this bill
would limit the exception for transactions
involving a commercial vehicle to com-
mercial vehicles with a gross vehicle weight
rating of more than 10,000 pounds. The
bill would add to the list of exceptions
specified above a transaction involving a
manufactured home, a vehicle purchased
for export and exported outside the terri-
torial limits of the United States without
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being registered with DMV, or a new ve-
hicle that will be substantially altered or
modified by a converter, which the bill
would define, prior to resale.
Existing law requires DMV to furnish
an autobroker's registration certificate to
a dealer who registers with DMV as an
autobroker. This bill would, instead, re-
quire DMV to furnish the dealer with an
autobroker's endorsement o the dealer's
license. [S. Trans]
AB 1218 (Sher). Existing law makes
it unlawful for a licensed dealer, as de-
fined, to, among other things, advertise
that the selling price of a vehicle is above,
below, or at, among other things, the man-
ufacturer's or distributor's invoice price to
the dealer. As introduced February 23, this
bill would make it unlawful for any person
to use the terms "invoice," "dealer in-
voice," or "dealer cost" in an advertise-
ment relating to the sale or lease of a
vehicle. The bill would make conforming
charges in the existing provisions govern-
ing dealer advertising. [S. Trans]
* LITIGATION
In Roulette Dealership Group of Cal-
ifornia, Inc. v. American Honda Motor
Co., Inc., No. H010858 (Sixth District
Court of Appeal), Honda is challenging a
jury verdict of nearly $7 million in favor
of Roulette on claims of breach of con-
tract, bad faith denial of existence of con-
tract, and conspiracy to interfere with pro-
spective economic advantage arising out
of Honda's termination of a letter of intent
agreement with Roulette for an Acura
dealership in San Jose. In an amicus cu-
riae brief, NMVB contends that the judg-
ment should be reversed because Roulette
failed to exhaust its administrative reme-
dies before the Board. At this writing, the
Sixth District has not yet scheduled oral
argument.
Mark K. Edward, et al. v. Mazda Motor
of America, Inc., et al., No. CV736159
(Santa Clara County Superior Court), arises
from the plaintiffs' failed attempt to pur-
chase a Mazda dealership. Plaintiffs claim
that the defendants wrongfully interfered
with the purchase; specifically, the plaintiffs'
claims against Mazda and its agents involve
alleged intentional and negligent interfer-
ence with economic relations, breach of im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, and violation of Vehicle Code section
11713.3. In February 1994, NMVB submit-
ted an amicus curiae brief supporting
Mazda's demurrer based on the plaintiffs'
failure to exhaust administrative remedies
before the Board; the trial court sustained the
demurrer with leave to amend on the ground
that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their ad-
ministrative remedies, and sustained a sec-
ond demurrer on plaintiffs' amended com-
plaint. The plaintiffs have appealed to the
Sixth District Court of Appeal, where the
matter is now pending.
* RECENT MEETINGS
At its January 25 meeting, NMVB unan-
imously elected Manning Post to serve as
President and Lucille Mazeika to serve as
Vice-President for 1995.
E FUTURE MEETINGS







n 1922, California voters approved a con-
stitutional initiative which created the
Board of Osteopathic Examiners; 1991 leg-
islation changed the Board's name to the
Osteopathic Medical Board of California
(OMBC). Today, pursuant to Business and
Professions Code section 3600 et seq.,
OMBC regulates entry into the osteopathic
profession, examines and approves schools
and colleges of osteopathic medicine, and
enforces professional standards. The Board
is empowered to adopt regulations to imple-
ment its enabling legislation; OMBC's reg-
ulations are codified in Division 16, Title
16 of the California Code of Regulations
(CCR). The 1922 initiative, which provided
for a five-member Board consisting of prac-
ticing doctors of osteopathy (DOs), was
amended in 1982 to include two public
members. The Board now consists of seven
members, appointed by the Governor, serv-
ing staggered three-year terms.
At this writing, OMBC is functioning
with two vacancies-one professional
member and one public member. Addi-
tionally, the term of Richard Bond, DO, is
scheduled to expire on June 1.
U MAJOR PROJECTS
Board's Budget Woes Appeased, But
Not Abated. At this writing, OMBC has
exhausted its budget for fiscal year 1994-
95. At OMBC's March 3 meeting, staff
reported that it has requested a deficiency
appropriation of $60,000 so that the Board
may continue its enforcement functions
until June 30. OMBC has also benefitted
from the license fee increase authorized by
AB 3732 (Takasugi) (Chapter 895, Stat-
utes of 1994). [15:1 CRLR 163; 14:4 CRLR
196] AB 3732 contained an urgency
clause, enabling OMBC to immediately
seek the fee increase, which it did in Oc-
tober by adopting amendments to section
1690, Title 16 of the CCR. On January 26,
the Office of Administrative Law (OAL)
approved the fee increase (see below);
OMBC has been collecting the increased
licensing fees and using them to support
its ailing enforcement program since that
date. At this writing, OMBC is also await-
ing response on a budget change proposal
it submitted seeking additional funds of
$150,000 for fiscal year 1995-96.
Infection Control Regulations Ap-
proved. On January 26, OAL approved
OMBC's adoption of new section 1633,
Title 16 of the CCR, which sets forth min-
imum standards for infection control in
the practice of osteopathy through refer-
ence to U.S. Centers for Disease Control
documents. [15:1 CRLR 164] The stan-
dards are aimed at preventing the trans-
mission of bloodborne pathogens, espe-
cially HIV and hepatitis. The Board is
currently considering the most cost-effi-
cient method of distributing the standards
to its licensees.
Regulatory Package Approved. Also
on January 26, OAL approved OMBC's
amendments to sections 1609, 1610, 1630,
1635, 1636, 1641, 1646, 1647, 1650, 1651,
1669, 1670, 1673, 1678, 1681, and 1690,
Title 16 of the CCR. Among other things,
these amendments change annual fees to
biennial fees and raise specified fees; add
chiropractors to the list of those author-
ized to be included in osteopathic medical
corporation registration; provide that a li-
cense will not be renewed if there is a
continuing education deficiency at the time
of biennial renewal; raise fees for restora-
tion of forfeited certificates; and delete
required forms contained in an appendix.
[15:1 CRLR 163-64]
*RECENT MEETINGS
At its March 3 meeting, OMBC noted
that the number of applicants for the os-
teopathic examination has declined.
N FUTURE MEETINGS





President: Daniel Win. Fessler
(415) 703-1487
T he California Public Utilities Com-
mission (PUC) was created in 1911 to
regulate privately-owned utilities and en-
sure reasonable rates and service for the
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